Vuk Perišić: Demokratija – dezodorans za fašistički smrad?

Ne postoji ljudski izum ili dostignuće koje se nije otelo svojoj prvotnoj svrsi i preobrazilo u opasno oružje. Dinamit i nuklearna energija su klasični i banalni primjeri, a posljednji događaji na jugoistoku Europe potvrđuju da se to zbiva i s demokracijom i to na vrlo osebujan način.

I Grčka i Srbija i Hrvatska imaju višestranački sustav i nominalno demokratske ustave, institucije i procedure koje jamče ljudska prava i građanske slobode. No je li ta forma ispunjena demokratskim sadržajem? Jesu li te zemlje doista demokratske?

Slučaj prvi. Grčka. Politička elita stvori astronomski javni dug. Dug dođe na naplatu i pokaže se da dužnik nema ni novca ni pokrića, čime ugrozi svoje vjerovnike. Vjerovnici predlože izvjesna, možda dobra, možda loša rješenja jer dugovi se, naime, moraju vraćati, ovako ili onako. To je staro i neumitno načelo imovinskog prava. Ostaje samo pitanje tko će vratiti dug: grčka država ili građani Grčke? To jedino meritorno pitanje nije bilo postavljeno na posljednjim grčkim izborima. Nitko se nije upitao zašto bi građani trebali biti jamci javnog duga, dakle taoci svoje države. Istina, postoji začkoljica. Grčka država – i kada bi htjela – ne može znatan dio građana poštedjeti te talačke situacije iz jednostavnog razloga što je velik dio biračkog tijela zaposlen u javnom sektoru. Neminovno smanjenje javnih troškova neće dakle pogoditi samo državu i političku elitu nego i mnoge građane. Drugim riječima, grčka država nije stvorila samo prisilne jamce i taoce nego i suučesnike. Jasno, kada su primali onu famoznu četrnaestu plaću, zaposlenici se nisu pitali postoji li pokriće za tu rastrošnost. Ne treba im zamjeriti, jer države su sposobne uvući svoje građane i u neusporedivo opasnije kriminalne avanture. Nitko se nije usudio tim ljudima reći da su prevareni, da za njihova nepotrebna i preplaćena radna mjesta nema više novca i da tog novca zapravo nikad nije ni bilo. Umjesto suočenja s istinom i podsjećanja na prastaru dužnost vraćanja dugova, umjesto neke nove, nulte godine u kojoj bi započeo spor i mukotrpan oporavak, političke stranke su građanima ponudile demagoško praznoslovlje pa i ekstremizam. Izbori su održani (ili će biti ponovno održani, svejedno) i demokratska forma je sačuvana, ali je ispražnjena od svakog demokratskog pa i svakog suvislog sadržaja.

Slučaj drugi. Srbija. Na predsjedničkim izborima pobijedio je radikalni nacionalist. Sa stanovišta demokratske procedure ti su izbori bili valjani. No ta puka forma Srbiju ne čini demokratskom zemljom, jer u Srbiji nema relevantne političke partije koja je sposobna izgovoriti nekoliko jednostavnih istina: da je Srbija izgubila Kosovo i da priznavanje neovisnosti Kosova i odricanje od rasističke albanofobije nema alternative. Nadalje, jednako važno, ako ne i važnije, nijedna od tri najjače političke partije u Srbiji ili ne želi, ili ne zna, ili ne može, ili najradije ne bi zauzela nedvosmislen i jasan stav prema užasu koji je srpski nacionalizam izazvao na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije u drugoj polovici osamdesetih i devedesetih godina. Drugim riječima, diskontinuitet u odnosu na Miloševićevu zločinačku politiku je polovičan, kompromisan, iznuđen, neiskren, u najboljem slučaju nepotpun, dakle moralno neupotrebljiv. Bez tog diskontinuiteta, bez te denacifikacije izbori u Srbiji nemaju demokratski legitimitet, nego su neka vrst ankete koja ispituje količinu autizma i bunila u kojem su građani Srbije zatočeni već preko dvadeset godina.

Slučaj treći. Hrvatska. Na čelo najjače oporbene stranke, dakle na čelo organizacije koja bi po definiciji trebala biti najvažniji jamac demokracije, došao je čovjek koji ne vidi ili ne zna uvidjeti proturječje između svoga svečanog protivljenja svakom obliku totalitarizma i svoje privrženosti totalitarnoj ideologiji kakav je nacionalizam. On ne zna ili ne želi znati da zemlja u kojoj parlament sluša crkvu nije demokratska republika nego feudalna teokracija. Dobivši monolitnu organizaciju koja će se obnovljenom strašću posvetiti nacionalističkim budalaštinama, Hrvatska je izgubila oporbu. Dobila je histeričnu falangu koja će napadati svaki dobar potez vladajuće koalicije (kojih je ionako malo, a i tada su bojažljivi i polovični), a na loše poteze vlasti reagirat će širenjem moralne panike. Zemlja u kojoj se ni vlast nije nedvosmisleno i beskompromisno distancirala od nacionalizma i u kojoj se oporba ponosi svojim nacionalizmom nije demokratska zemlja nego dijagnoza. Činjenica da HDZ poraz na izborima nije iskoristio za svoju demokratizaciju nego za produbljivanje svoje moralne i intelektualne bijede te da između predsjedničkih kandidata i nije bilo suštinskih razlika samo je dio opće, vrlo nevesele kliničke slike.

U Grčkoj, Srbiji i Hrvatskoj demokracija nije sredstvo kojim građani kontroliraju političku elitu, nego ritual kojim politička elita kontrolira građane. Štoviše, postojanje formalne demokracije u tim je zemljama političkim elitama samo olakšalo korumpiranje građana, negdje četrnaestom plaćom, negdje nacionalističkim izmišljotinama. Njihova suverenost nema nikakvu racionalnu funkciju i svodi se na održavanje virtualnog, paralelnog svijeta u kojem važe neka drugačija moralna pravila pa čak i drugačija percepcija stvarnosti. U tom svijetu nema vraćanja dugova, troši se lažni novac, država je i san i smisao života, jedan odvratni nacionalistički rat je totem s dignitetom, Kosovo (i tko zna što još) je u sastavu Srbije, a Ratko Mladić i ostali generali nisu zločinci nego heroji. Da slika bude potpuna, treba spomenuti i takozvanu Veliku ideju (Megali idea) po kojoj se Grčka prostire do Kavkaza. Uvijek se nađe dovoljno podanika koji u takvim poniženjima i nasrtajima na zdrav razum vide nešto čemu vrijedi dati i glas na izborima i život. I uvijek ima dovoljno smutljivaca koji će takve halucinacije nazvati demokracijom.

Taj prešutni sporazum između političke elite i gomile ima demokratsku formu i stvara privid demokratskog legitimiteta ne bi li prikrio bezakonje, prijevaru, krađu i laž, nerijetko i ubojstvo. Fašizam se umiva demokratskom procedurom jer više nije naivan da bi marširao ulicama. No demokracija nije déodorant za prikrivanje fašističkog smrada. Ona je, za razliku od fašizma i njegovih nacionalističkih inačica, prije svega pravo na izbor, pri čemu je u lažnoj demokraciji izbor dekorativan, ritualan i formalan, dok je u stvarnoj demokraciji moguće birati između doista različitih i jasno definiranih političkih svjetonazora. I konačno, ono najvažnije: posljedice tog izbora nikada i nipošto ne smiju biti sudbonosne jer neka država demokratska je onoliko koliko se suzdržava od zadiranja u sudbinu građana.

Kako stvari stoje u Grčkoj, katastrofa je neizbježna podjednako i s dosadašnjom političkom elitom i sa Syrizom i sa Zlatnom zorom. Na podjednak način i Srbija ostaje zemlja bez perspektive dok bude birala između beznadno polovičnog Tadića (bivšeg, ako je to bitno), Šešeljevog doglavnika i Miloševićevog nasljednika. I građani Hrvatske osuđeni su na jadnjikavo tumaranje dok se politička elita ne odrekne svojih zabluda i svoje potrebe da proizvodi i zlorabi zablude i dok se hrvatske političke dvojbe budu svodile na izbor između jedne nespretne, nedorečene, lakomislene i, biva sve jasnije, nesposobne koalicije, s jedne strane, i sablasnog HDZ-a, s druge strane.

Netko može reći da je pojava stvarne demokratske alternative koja će državu staviti u službu građanskih interesa, odreći se nacionalnih fikcija s dužnom količinom ironije i građane, jednostavno rečeno, pustiti na miru, u tim zemljama nemoguća i utopijska. U redu, ako je tako, građane Grčke, Srbije i Hrvatske od potpunog poniženja može spasiti tek spoznaja da mogu birati samo između utopije i beznađa.

izvor: tportal.hr / pescanik.net 

Comments

  1. Odličan tekst, Perišić standardno dobar.

    Ne znam do kraja zašto, podjsetio me je na jos jednu dobru analizu, Francisa Fukuyame:

    The Two Europes
    Francis Fukuyama

    The Greek election on Sunday was a predictable disaster: the two mainstream parties, the socialist PASOK and the center-right New Democracy (ND), were displaced by new extremist parties that appeared on their right and left, including the left-wing Syriza and KKE (Communist) parties which won a quarter of the vote between them, and the right-wing Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn parties getting almost 18 percent.

    The main issues in the campaign revolved around whether Greece should fulfill the terms of the pact that had been negotiated with the EU and IMF and continue the austerity that implied. None of the parties, however, was willing to take up what from the beginning was the source of Greece’s problems, and the reason it got into such trouble with its public debt in the first place, which is the country’s pervasive clientelism.

    There has been plenty of talk about two Europes, which evolved from being a story about the peripheral PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) to being one about the EU’s north and south, because it was clear that Italy and potentially France also faced large debt and bank problems. This is often portrayed as a contrast between a hard-working, Protestant, disciplined northern Europe (Germany, Holland, and Scandinavia) against a lazy, profligate Catholic-Orthodox south. But the real division is not a cultural one; it is between a clientelistic and non-clientelistic Europe.

    Clientelism occurs when political parties use public resources, and particularly government offices, as a means of rewarding political supporters. Politicians provide not programmatic public policies, but individual benefits like a job in the post office, an intervention on behalf of a relative in trouble with the government, or sometimes an outright payment of money or goods.

    In my view, clientelism should be distinguished from corruption proper because of the relationship of reciprocity that exists between politicians and voters. There is a real degree of accountability in a clientelistic system: the politician has to give something back to supporters if he or she is to stay in power, even if that is a purely private benefit. True corruption is more predatory, such as a politician accepting a bribe or kickback that goes directly into a Swiss bank account for the benefit of the politician and his family alone. Giving out public jobs and directing resources to political supporters is legal in many countries, whereas bribery never is. One of the great tragedies of Afghanistan’s long-running civil war is that tribalism (which is inherently clientelistic) has broken down and been replaced by pure predation; returning to clientelism would actually constitute progress there.

    An alternative way of understanding clientelism is that it is an early form of democratic mobilization, one that is almost universally practiced in relatively poor countries that hold regular elections. It is pervasive in countries as diverse as India, Mexico, Brazil, Thailand, Kenya, and Nigeria. Clientelism is not the product of a cultural proclivity or a failure of politicians to understand how a modern democratic political system is supposed to operate. Rather, it is often the most efficient way to mobilize relatively poor and uneducated voters and get them into the polling place. Such voters often care less about programmatic policies than an immediate personal benefit like a job or the equivalent of a Thanksgiving turkey.

    America’s own history demonstrates this point: when the franchise was expanded in the 1820s and 30s to universal white male suffrage, the political parties responded by mobilizing these new masses of voters clientelistically. Indeed, the US invented both the mass political party and clientelism (or what in American history was known as the patronage system). For a century between the election of Andrew Jackson and the end of the Progressive Era, American politics at federal, state, and local levels was organized around the ability of the two competing parties to hand out government jobs.

    Germany, Scandinavia, Britain, and the Netherlands have never been dominated by clientelistic parties, while Italy, Greece, Spain, and Austria have been. As Martin Shefter pointed out in his 1993 book Political Parties and the State, the reason for this difference had to do with the relative timing of the consolidation of a modern Weberian bureaucratic state and the onset of democracy. Those countries like Prussia/Germany, France, Sweden, or Japan which were engaged in extended military competition during their autocratic phases succeeded in creating modern, merit-based bureaucracies. The autonomy of these bureaucracies was supported by an “absolutist coalition” which then protected them against colonization by political parties when the franchise and political competition was opened up. Political parties could distribute resources to interest groups, but not government jobs. This is why all of these countries continue to have relatively high-quality public sectors which, among other things, are better at managing fiscal deficits.

    In the United States, Italy, and Greece, by contrast, democracy arrived before the consolidation of a modern state; without a political coalition protecting bureaucratic autonomy, the public sectors of these countries were ripe for poaching by democratic politicians who needed jobs to mobilize mass publics. Greece as part of the Ottoman Empire never developed a strong, Prussian-style state. Democracy came to Greece relatively quickly after liberation from the Turks; universal male suffrage occurred in 1844 (this didn’t happen in Britain until well after the Third Reform Act of 1884), while parliamentarism was introduced in the 1870s. Political parties began to mobilize voters based on kinship and local village networks of patrons and clients. Capitalism was weakly developed there, so existing elites saw the state rather than the private sector as the main source of opportunity and resources. Urbanization in the 20th century did not involve the same transformation of Gemeinschaft into Gesellschaft as in Britain or Germany (that is, the breakdown of traditional kin and village networks and their replacement by a modern division of labor), but rather the transfer of Gemeinschaft wholesale into an urban environment, with the consequent survival of traditional patron-client relationships.

    This pattern continued throughout the 20th century, and particularly after Greece’s return to democracy in 1974 after the dictatorship of the colonels. The two mainstream political parties PASOK and ND sought power through the distribution of government jobs to supporters. Greece’s powerful public sector unions succeeded in getting tenure for civil servants. This meant that every rotation from one party to the next did not result in the firing of the other party’s workers, as happened under the American patronage system, but an expansion of overall public employment. Hence the roots of the country’s present crisis in an oversized public sector, and a total failure by any of the existing parties to undertake the type of structural reforms demanded by Brussels and the IMF.

    The Italian story is a bit more complicated. Northern Italy was organized around oligarchic and self-governing city states like Venice, Florence, Turin, Bologna, and Genoa, with reasonably good municipal governments. The south however had been part of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, ruled for much of the early modern period by the faraway Spanish Habsburgs on the basis of a hierarchical, feudal system of land tenure. The South of Italy had no history of an indigenous strong central government. When Italy was unified in the 1860s it chained together a North that was socially and economically not too different from Austria or southern Germany, to a South that was in effect a less developed country, both economically and socially.

    When postwar Italian democracy was born, northern elites faced the question of how to mobilize voters in the South, a region whose poverty meant that support for communism was potentially strong. What the Christian Democrats did was to transform the traditional patron-client relationships into modern clientelistic ones, in which public employment was used as the currency for votes. This system succeeded in stabilizing the country, at the cost of making impossible the formation of a strong, modern Weberian state. Much of the history of contemporary Italy has involved a struggle between a modern north and a clientelistic south. Clientelistic Italy, with the allied phenomena of the Mafia and organized crime, at times threatened to overwhelm the country as a whole. Modern Italy fought back with prosecutions and Tangentopoli, while part of the North under the guidance of Lega Nord threatened to break away from the South altogether. Edward Banfield’s “amoral familism” and Robert Putnam’s low social capital are both ways of describing the dysfunctional social system produced by clientelistic political organization in southern Italy.

    In the United States, clientelism was overcome eventually as a result of economic modernization. Industrialization of the country in the late 19th century produced new social groups like businessmen, professionals, and urban reformers who united in a Progressive Movement to push for civil service reform and merit-based bureaucracy. While the struggle to achieve the latter was slow and stretched over the better part of two generations, the US did manage by the middle of the 20th century to eliminate patronage on both federal and municipal levels. (One can argue that it has come back in a modern form of interest groups, but that’s a story for another post.)

    In Italy and Greece, however, a modern state has never managed to push aside the clientelistic one. In Italy, as just noted, there has at least been a struggle to see this come about. But in Greece, no progressive coalition ever emerged, despite the obvious disgust of many younger Greeks with the existing system. The imposition of technocratic governments under Mario Monti and Lucas Papademos, respectively, were efforts to force such changes by outside powers. But while the Greek government has been willing to slash certain forms of spending and raise taxes, neither of the traditional parties has been willing to undercut its own political base by attacking clientelism itself. Nor have any of the new extremist parties now represented in the Greek parliament made this a significant part of their programs.

    This is why the whole project of deepening Europe into a fiscal union seems to me like such a fairy tale. Outside pressure will never succeed in bringing about change by itself unless it can be allied to internal forces that themselves want reform. In Italy, these forces at least potentially exist, but in Greece they seem altogether absent.

    Solving the issue of clientelism would address one of the long-term sources of the current crisis. But any fix would have an effect only over a prolonged period, and is therefore not terribly relevant to the short-term future of either Greece or the EU. If the Greek public wants to reject the austerity agreement, which seems pretty clear, the country will be heading for outright default and exit from the euro. I always believed that exiting the euro was Greece’s only realistic option, and one that could have been done in a reasonably orderly way had it been undertaken some months ago. Now, it is being pushed as the preference of the extremist parties, and if it happens, will probably occur in a very messy way with bad consequences for the stability of Europe as a whole. So neither the long- or short-term futures look terribly bright.

  2. Тпортал, Пешчаник, мејнстрим, ово-оно… Ипак мислим да се у случају овога аутора ради о идиоту чије текстове не треба објављивати. Жали Боже презимена и породичне традиције. Ово је исто као да се обави интервју са Обрадом Мишом Станишићем из ДПС-а.

    Једино што је тачно и корисно у овоме тексту је оцјена о расистичкој албанофобији. Треба бити поштен и рећи да већина држављана, како Србије тако и Црне Горе, Албанце на такав начин посматра.

  3. Perisica znam samo iz tekstova (recimo, odusevio me je svojevremeno ovim), pa bi me bas interesovalo sta mu gospoda odozgo zamijeraju, jer je meni tip skroz na mjestu. Takodje bi me interesovalo, ako su Pescanik i Tportal (na kom ide jedan Robi K.) mainstream, sta li je Sekuli alternativa.

  4. Vidiš li Vladimire ovaj prilog “standardno” u tvom prvom komentaru i komentaru koji je napisao Razbibriga. Iz istog razloga iz kog ste ga vi nazvali standardnim, ja sam ga nazvao idiotom. Baš zato što je standardan.

    Buja nacizam na Balkanu. U Srbiji, Bosni i Hrvatskoj se masovo umnožava Majn Kampf i oštre noževi. Otvaraju se koncentracioni logori za Jevreje i priprema nova Kristalna noć. Ovakva infantilnost Nedoviću je posljedica usiljenosti u pisanju kolumni. Kvalitetno se piše kada se za to ima inspiracija, a ne kada imate striktno zadat rok od urednika.

    P.S.

    Da budem precizan, nije u pitanju mejnstrim već mejnstrim alternative.

    • Bratko, nista mi nisi rekao. Standardno dobar je vrlina, ne mana, jer nije standardan, nego dobar, i u tome konzistentan. Perisic se ovdje bavi nekom drugom temom (koja se vama valjda cini sporednom?), a zasad nisam zakljucio da bjezi i od ovih ‘ozbiljnijih’.

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